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Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in
the Academy: A Tort Remedy
Geri J. Yonover*
I. Introduction
It is the best of times, it is the worst of times.
Information about the Holocaust is being disseminated more
widely than at any time in the last five decades. The Holocaust
Museum in Washington, D.C. is drawing record numbers of visitors
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.A. University of Chicago,
1964; J.D. Chicago Kent College of Law, 1983. I thank Paul Brietzke and Robert Blomquist
for their insightful comments and Terry Bloede for her secretarial support in preparing this
article.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Hubert L. Will, 1914-1995, Judge of the
Northern District of Illinois since 1961. During my two years serving as Judge Will's law
clerk, 1983-85, and the ensuing years of friendship, I was privileged to be in the company of
a man who served, unswervingly, the cause of justice. Judge Will lived with such grace, zest
and dedication that the rest of us could only marvel at his energy and his accomplishments.
In 1944-45, he was Chief of the Counter-Espionage Branch, European Theater, OSS. On
April 11, 1945, he was one of the first Americans to enter Buchenwald.
In his Summer 1995 address in Strasbourg, Judge Will recalls that day fifty years ago:
The tour of Buchenwald was one of the most unhappy experiences of my
life. In addition to our guide, a large number of emaciated inmates joined us.
Almost immediately we saw the long pile of naked corpses about five feet high,
thousands of skeletons covered only with skin. I have read that they were neatly
stacked like logs on a cordwood stockpile. I remember them as carelessly thrown
on top of each other in grotesque configurations. Close by was the crematorium
still warm. Rows of barracks stretched as far as I could see. We went into one
and a number of the inmates were in their three-high straw-covered bunks too
weak to move or do more than raise a hand. I opened the door at the end of
another barracks and several corpses fell at my feet from the top of a pile of
naked bodies. Several inmates picked them up, put them back on the pile and we
closed the door.
I could go on describing the almost unbelievable horror of what we saw but
many of you were there and I don't have to describe it to you. I am sure that
whatever camp you were in, it was the same. If I had not seen it, I would not
have believed that human beings could do to other human beings what I saw at
Buchenwald.
Hubert L. Will, Address at Strasbourg (June 23, 1995) (on file with author and Judge Will's
chambers, Chicago, I11.).
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more than two million per year since opening! Many school
districts across the nation are including the study of the Holocaust
in their educational programs.2 The fiftieth anniversary of the end
of World War II and the liberation of the Nazi death camps have
been marked by celebration, prayer and extensive media atten-
tion.' "Schindler's List," a movie about the Holocaust, received the
Academy Award for Best Picture and has been widely embraced
by moviegoers. In Germany, laws have been enacted which make
it a crime to claim that the Nazi extermination of European Jews
never occurred,4 and these laws have withstood constitutional
attack.
Yet, the Anti-Defamation League reports increased incidents
of anti-Semitism5 and significant numbers of adult Americans hold
anti-Semitic views.6 During the same week the Holocaust Museum
opened, the Roper Organization reported that twenty-two percent
1. George F. Will, Ordinary Germans?, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1996, at C7.
2. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51220 note, § 3(b), (c) (Deering Supp. 1995) ("The
Legislature recognizes the importance of teaching our youth ethical and moral behavior
specifically relating to human rights violations, genocide issues, and slavery, as well as the
Holocaust. The Legislature finds and declares that the Model Curriculum for Human Rights
and Genocide, adopted by the State Board of Education pursuant to Section 51226 of the
Education Code, is an important resource in teaching our youth the historical lessons of
human rights violations, genocide, slavery, and the Holocaust."); FLA. STAT. ch. 233.061(1)(f)
(1994)("The history of the Holocaust (1933-1945), the systematic, planned annihilation of
European Jews and other groups by Nazi Germany, a watershed event in the history of
humanity, to be taught in a manner that leads to an investigation of human behavior, an
understanding of the ramifications of prejudice, racism, and stereotyping, and an examination
of what it means to be a responsible and respectful person, for the purposes of encouraging
tolerance of diversity in a pluralistic society and for nurturing and protecting democratic
values and institutions."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, para. 5/27-20.3 (1995) ("The studying of
this material is a reaffirmation of the commitment of free peoples from all nations to never
again permit the occurrence of another Holocaust."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 233G.040 (1991);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 4A-1 (West Supp. 1996); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 801(1) (Consol. Supp.
1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-216.20 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-29-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1995). The Connecticut legislature has also proposed such a program. 1995 CONN. SEN. B.
126.
3. See, e.g., Walter Reich, Holocaust's Child, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at C7. Walter
Reich is the director of the U.S. Holocaust Museum.
4. Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the
"Auschwitz"-and Other-"Lies", 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 285-87 (1986).
5. See Abraham H. Foxman, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1995, at 9. See also David E. Rovella,
Hate Crime Drop Disputed, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4, 1995, at A6 (noting that the FBI's
announcement of a significant decrease in hate crimes does not comport with observations
of discrimination watchdog groups.).
6. Megan Rosenfeld, Enough Already! Brando & Co.: A Gallery of Show Biz Anti-
Semitism, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1996, at G01 (citing report claiming that one in five
Americans harbor anti-Semitic views).
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of adults polled considered it possible that the Holocaust never
happened and twelve percent said they did not know if the
Holocaust was possible.7
Soon we will lose the eyewitnesses! Holocaust victims, and
victimizers, are now elderly and their first-hand, personal accounts
of what happened in Auschwitz, Dachau, Berkenau and other Nazi
concentration camps will no longer be available unless they, or
their families, preserve these memories in print or video.9 Many
of us are saddened, though not greatly surprised, by the anti-
Semitic innuendo and questioning of the reality of the Holocaust 0
which emanate from splinter groups in our society. When members
of the academy give voice to these messages, however, we are
outraged and perplexed. The academy bears a special responsi-
bility to search for and speak the truth." One of the rationales
7. Michiko Kakutani, Critic's Notebook; When History is a Casualty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1993, at C1.
8. Sadly, we are also facing the demise of American soldiers, such as Judge Will, see
supra, note *, who entered the concentration camps at war's end and bore witness to the
Nazi atrocities.
9. Following on the heels of "Schindler's List," the Spielberg Project is in the process
of interviewing and videotaping both concentration camp survivors and those survivors who
fled the Nazis but experienced the terrible pain and agonizing frustration of not being able
to get the rest of their family out of harm's way. For many of these people, this is the first
time they have revealed fully to their children and grandchildren their experiences.
"Schindler's List" may have served as a catalyst to open the blocked lines of communication
about these personal tragedies and to facilitate preservation of the record of the Holocaust.
10. Invariably, anti-Semitism precedes and is conjoined with denial of the Holocaust.
See DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON
TRUTH AND MEMORY 65 (1993). "The real aim of the Holocaust deniers is ... to make
world opinion safe for anti-Semitism again." Richard Wolin, Holocaust Deniers Concealing
Dangerous Agenda, HOus. CHRON., Jan. 5, 1994 at A17.
Several authors address Holocaust denial. See, e.g., LIPSTADT, supra; KENNETH S.
STERN, HOLOCAUST DENIAL (1993); PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, ASSASSINS OF MEMORY:
ESSAYS ON THE DENIAL OF THE HOLOCAUST (1992).
11. Valparaiso's statement about the mission of a University is typical: "To serv[e]
humanity through the vigorous pursuit of truth and the transmission of knowledge ... [to]
seek to ask humankind's deepest questions with clarity and sharpness and to test answers to
those questions by means of research and reason, hypothesis and experiment, imagination
and art." VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY, THE LUTHERAN CHARACTER OF VALPARAISO
UNIVERSITY 1 (1995).
Perhaps in recognition of the uniqueness of the campus, a number of universities,
including Valparaiso, adopted student codes which penalize hate speech and racial and
gender harassment. Richard Delgado and David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against
Hate-Speech Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1810-11 (1994). Many did not survive judicial scrutiny. Id. at 1811.
It is ironic that many universities are attempting to control student speech when, often, they
are unwilling or unable to control Holocaust denial rhetoric by the professoriate. See infra
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behind the American tenure system is to foster such truthseeking
in an atmosphere free from coercion and constraint. Although the
tension between free speech and academic responsibility may be
irreconcilable, we and the academy must not abandon the truth.
Even within the current system boundaries are present; sanctions
are available.
This Article will describe several recent incidents which
illustrate the special problems posed when professors profess
messages of hate and denials of truth. The truth of the Holocaust
was established by the Nuremberg trials and the news reports and
newsreel coverage of the liberation of the German concentration
camps. It was an event "which [went] beyond the frontiers of
human cruelty and savagery."' 2  As the West German Federal
Supreme Court noted: "The documents about the destruction of
millions of Jews are overwhelming."13
II. Holocaust Denial-"Defamers of the Dead"' 4
No more than a decade after the end of World War II and the
liberation of the death camps, some American academics began to
question the reality of what had happened-despite the Nuremberg
trials. David Leslie Hoggan wrote a dissertation at Harvard, which
formed the basis of a book he later published. In his book,
Hoggan claimed, in part, that no Jewish people were killed during
or in the immediate aftermath of the Kristallnacht.15 Hoggan's
book was realized partly with the aid of Harry Elmer Barnes, an
author of texts used at several American universities and lecturer
at other college campuses. 6 According to one German historian,
"rarely have so many inane and unwarranted theses, allegations
and 'conclusions' ... been crammed into a volume written under
the guise of history."' 7
notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
12. 4 INT'L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 450 (1946-49).
13. Stein, supra note 4, at 288. The West German Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a law which allowed a criminal prosecution of a defendant who had
distributed a leaflet which termed the murder of millions of Jews a "Zionist swindle." Id.
14. Elie Wiesel, Address at the Hofstra University Conference on Group Defamation
and Freedom of Speech (Apr. 20, 1988). See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
15. LIPSTADT, supra note 10, at 71. During the 1950s, Hoggan was teaching history at
the University of California-Berkeley. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 73.
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One of the most egregious examples of Holocaust denial in the
academy is the case of Arthur Butz. Butz, a professor of electrical
engineering tenured since 1974 at Northwestern University,
published "The Hoax of the Twentieth Century" in 1976.8 The
central thesis of Butz's book-that the claim that millions of Jews
were exterminated by the Nazi's during World War II was a
propaganda hoax to further "Zionist ends" 9 -came wrapped in
the mantle of scholarly discourse. At numerous points in the book,
however, Butz's "scholarship" is compromised by his rejection of
any counter evidence as "lies," "insan[ity]," "absurd[ity]" and
"nonsense" of the Holocaust.2" Butz's work is now part of the
anti-Semitic canon of the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazi organiza-
tions, and Butz repeated his views at a 1985 meeting of Louis
Farrakhan's Nation of Islam.21
Northwestern's response to Butz's claim of academic freedom
was generous. He had tenure and the faculty supported him.
Nevertheless, the administration encouraged the history department
to hold a series of lectures about the truth of the Holocaust.22 In
1991, on Holocaust Remembrance Day at Northwestern University,
volunteers read some 9,000 names of Holocaust victims.' Yet,
Butz continues calling the Holocaust "the extermination legend"
and Northwestern pays for his homepage, which broadcasts
Holocaust revisionism on the World Wide Web.24
Even before "Web" access, Butz's influence spread. In 1990
in a town a few miles from Northwestern's Evanston campus,
parents who objected to Holocaust studies required by Illinois law
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 125 (quoting ARTHUR BuTz, THE HOAX OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 87
(1976)).
20. LIPSTADT, supra note 10, at 124-25.
21. Id. at 126.
22. STERN, supra note 10, at 11. Kenneth S. Stem is Program Specialist on Anti-
Semitism for the American Jewish Committee.
23. Id. at 160 n.14. Contrast Northwestern's handling of the Butz situation with another
university. In 1991, Stanford University denied tenure to Norman Davies, a visiting
professor of Polish history, not because his views were "political activity," but because
numerous faculty members believed his book "'was insufficiently analytical and tend[ed] to
substitute rhetoric and irony for clear historical analysis and explanation."' The book
allegedly minimized historical anti-Semitism in Poland. Court Upholds Stanford U,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 17, 1991, Jewish World Section.
24. Edward Walsh, Professor's Holocaust Views Put Freedom Issues On Line, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 1997, at A3.
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withdrew their daughter from junior high school.' They termed
the curriculum the product of "Jewish propagandists who wanted
the world to learn 'gross distortions and myths' and relied on
Butz's book to support their position.26
Butz is not alone. Other deniers of the Holocaust wear
academic robes. In 1987, a Colorado public high school teacher
called the Holocaust a "'holohoax"' and distributed copies of an
article entitled "Swindlers of the Crematoria."'27 After she was
disciplined, the teacher sued and the school district settled for a
sum slightly less than $4,000.2  At Indiana University-Purdue
University at Indianapolis in 1990, a teacher of an introductory
Western Civilization class called the Holocaust a "myth" and stated
that "the worst thing about Hitler is that without him, there would
not be an Israel."29  Others have tried to teach a course using
Butz's work but have been prevented. Yet a South Carolina
teacher reported in the Institute for Historical Review ° that his
students were "captivated by Holocaust denial."31
Holocaust denial and "revisionism" in the academy is not
purely an American phenomenon. The Arthur Butzes of our
country are joined by Robert Faurisson, professor of literature at
the University of Lyon, author of "The Rumour of Auschwitz";
Ernst Nolte, onetime chair of the modern history department at the
Free University in Berlin and the University of Marburg; Werner
25. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, para 5/27-20.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
The Winnetka school community responded to Safet and Ingeborg Savich's protest by
supplementing the Holocaust class teachings with teacher seminars on prejudicial
propaganda, moral choice and anti-Semitism. One teacher was quoted as saying: "In the past
we treated Holocaust deniers like the Flat Earth Society. . . . Now they're getting too
aggressive to ignore." John McCormick, The Holocaust's New Lessons, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
3, 1990, at 52.
26. STERN, supra note 10, at 10.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 11.
30. This institute purports to be a historical revisionist society that believes the
Holocaust to be a "distortion" of history that should be clarified in order to prevent future
wars. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS § 9 (15572) (Sandra Joszczak ed., 31st ed. 1996).
31. STERN, supra note 10, at 11. Holocaust revisionism has touched Congress as well.
In January, 1995, Newt Gingrich hired and promptly fired Christina Jeffrey as Historian of
the House of Representatives, an $85,000 a year position, upon discovering that Jeffrey, a
1984 consultant to the Education Department, had issued a recommendation denying federal
funding for a Holocaust education program because it lacked "the Nazi point of view."
Jeffrey is also said to have criticized a junior high school course on the Holocaust "for failing
to include the views of the Ku Klux Klan." Michael Ross, Fired Historian Denounces
Charges as 'Outrageous', L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1995, at A10.
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Maser, professor at Halle University in Germany; Gunter Deckert,
a former high school teacher in Germany; Malcolm Ross and James
Keegstra, Canadian schoolteachers; and Jean-Louis Bonnat,
professor at the University of Nantes, France. At one time or
another, each wrote or taught about the Holocaust in such a way
as to negate or undermine its reality.32
According to Kenneth Stern of the American Jewish Commit-
tee, deniers such as Butz and the others "intentionally cloak the
controversy they create in the garb of academic freedom and the
discovery of knowledge through debate."33 When these academic
suppressors of truth and mongerers of anti-Semitism speak, they do
so in voices that we are accustomed to hear as reasoned, enlight-
ened and scholarly. As such, they carry the cdchd of academia,
even if they lack academic imprimatur. This is what makes their
message so dangerous and our response to them so problematic.
For implicated in our response to such hate speech are notions of
academic freedom and freedom of expression under the First
Amendment.34
III. Control of Hate Speech in the United States and Other
Countries
If Elie Wiesel is correct, to deny the Holocaust is to defame
the dead35 and to cause direct suffering to the survivors of the
Death Camps, their children and grandchildren, as well as to the
relatives of those who died. The connection between anti-Semitism
and Holocaust denial and the creation of a climate which fosters
32. See John Dornberg, The Real Menace in Germany-The "Intellectual" Far Right,
GERMAN LIFE, Mar. 31, 1995, at 20, available in 1 ETHNIc NEWSWATCH 20 (Mar. 31, 1995);
Stephen Scheinberg & Karen R. Mock, Malcolm Ross Should Have Faced Hate-Propaganda
Charge, GAZETTE (Montreal, Quebec), Jan. 5, 1994, at B3; Sharon Waxman, Speaking
Terms: Europe's Left and Right Are Too Divided To Even Talk About It, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
13, 1993, § 5 at 1. See also Sharon Waxman, Question on Jews Sparks Furor: French
Professor Chastised for Essay Exam's Wording, CHI. TRiB., June 28, 1994, News at 10.
Waxman also reports that the University of Nantes had, in 1985, granted a doctorate to an
anti-Semitic thesis writer who denied the existence of the Nazi gas chambers. "After a public
outcry, the government minister of universities disqualified the thesis." Id.
33. STERN, supra note 10, at 11.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. See Wiesel, supra note 14. I suspect that Wiesel speaks metaphorically. Historically,
defamation, which protects reputational interests, has been available only to living persons.
Since there is no living person whose reputation is compromised, courts generally agree there
is no cause of action. See, e.g., Grushus v. Curtis Pub. Co., 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965);
Bello v. Random House, Inc. 422 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1967).
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animosity, racial hatred, and repression is not tenuous. The
language of Holocaust denial can be termed group defamation.36
Rhetoric can often trigger action. Speech can turn into conduct.
Words can migrate into "sticks and stones" which do, indeed, harm
us. It is no accident that German narrative depicting Jews as evil
preceded and justified the Nazi genocide."
Recognizing the relationship between speech and conduct, and
in response to the Holocaust, a number of nations have enacted
laws proscribing certain forms of "hate speech." As of 1986, over
a dozen nations had enacted prohibitions against hate propagan-
da." Canada enacted federal legislation criminalizing hate
propaganda.39  The provinces of British Columbia4" and
Manitoba41 provide for civil suits by groups victimized by hate
propaganda. France has criminalized Holocaust denial,42 as have
Austria43 and Germany.44 None of these nations, however, have
constitutional or statutory provisions which correspond to our First
Amendment. Even if similar legislation were to be enacted in this
country, it is not at all clear that it would pass constitutional
scrutiny under recent Supreme Court holdings.
45
36. See generally Michael Blain, Group Defamation and the Holocaust, in GROUP
DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 45 (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric M. Freedman
eds., 1995). Blain calls this "incitatory rhetoric," "language function[ing] as an incitement
to action in political movements." Id. at 48, 55.
37. Id. at 54. See also infra note 38.
38. See Debate: Freedom of Speech and Holocaust Denial, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 559,580
(1987) [hereinafter Debate]. The International Convention on The Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1990,660 U.N.T.S. 195, also proscribes
racist hate propaganda, perhaps in recognition of the fact that such messages were "clearly
connected" to the rise of Nazism. See Mari J. Matsuda, Outsider Jurisprudence: Toward a
Victim's Analysis of Racial Hate Messages, in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, supra note 36, at 88, 92-93.
39. Hate Propaganda Act, R.C.S. ch. C-34, § 281.1-.3 (1970) as amended by ch. 11 (1st
Supp. 1970)(Can.). See also id. at § 177. The Canadian Human Rights Act, 2 Can. Stat. ch.
33 (1976-77), prohibits the dissemination of hate propaganda. In a 4-3 decision in 1992 the
Canadian Supreme Court held unconstitutional the False News provision, § 177. Zundel v.
The Queen et al., 95 D.L.R.4th 202 (1992).
40. Libel and Slander Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 234 (1979)(Can.).
41. Defamation Act, R.S.M. ch. 20 (1970)(Can.).
42. J.O. 90-615 (July 13, 1990)(Fr.).
43. BGB1 No. 148 (Mar. 19, 1992)(Aus.).
44. See Stein, supra note 4, at 312-14. Denmark, Sweden, and England also protect
against group defamation. See Kenneth Lasson, To Stimulate, Provoke, or 1 Hate?: Hate
Speech and the First Amendment, in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra
note 36, at 268, 283-84.
45. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (holding statute which
criminalized "fighting words" "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
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Currently, only sixteen states lack a hate crime law with
penalty enhancement.46 Seventeen states and the District of
Columbia have enacted statutes which provide for data collection
on hate crimes.47 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
permit a civil action based on hate crimes.48 Whether any of these
provisions are susceptible to constitutional attack under R.A.V v.
City of St. Paul49 or Wisconsin v. Mitchell" remains to be seen."
The Court's language in a 1989 case suggests that legislation in this
area is tenuous at best: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."52  Conversely, older cases such as
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire53 and Beauharnais v. Illinois,4
anger, alarm or resentment in others on 'the basis of race [or] religion ... "' violates the First
Amendment because it does not criminalize all fighting words, just those based on content,
and the content restriction failed to meet the appropriate test). But see Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (upholding a Wisconsin statute which provided for enhanced
sentencing for intentionally selecting a person as a criminal target based on race, religion,
ancestry and other marking concepts).
The international community is sensitive to the problem of reconciling regulation of
racist hate propaganda with American free speech principles. See Matsuda, supra note 38.
46. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIME LAWS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 29,
32-33 (1994).
47. Id. at 35-36.
48. Id. at 36-37.
49. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See supra note 45.
50. 508 U.S. 476 (1993). See supra note 45.
51. In State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994), the Florida Supreme Court rejected
a constitutional challenge to Florida's penalty enhancing hate crime statute, FLA. STAT. CH.
775.085 (1989). The Stalder defendant had attacked a Jewish attorney and made anti-Semitic
comments that continued in future meetings with the attorney. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072.
52. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989), cited in R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 430 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring). On the other hand, offensive expression "may be proscribed when
it intrudes upon a 'captive audience."' R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 n.13 (White, J., concurring)
(citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988)).
53. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In this case, the defendant had called the city marshall a "God-
damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist" during the course of his arrest and was convicted
under a New Hampshire statute which proscribed "address[ing] any offensive, derisive or
annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street." Id. at 569 (quoting N.H.
LAWS 378.2).
54. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding an Illinois provision proscribing publication or
exhibition of a lithograph that exposed citizens of any race to contempt or derision where
petitioner had been fined for distributing flyers degrading to African Americans). Although
some courts wonder whether Beauharnais is still good law, it has not been overruled. See
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (affirming the
unconstitutionality of certain Skokie, Illinois ordinances intended to halt the march of a neo-
Nazi organization through a predominantly Jewish neighborhood). Language in R.A.V.,
however, leaves Beauharnais, as well as Chaplinsky, in limbo. See infra note 56.
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relied upon by the lower Canadian courts in Holocaust denial
cases,55 create a favorable climate for hate speech regulation, even
though these cases appear to have been eviscerated (though not
overruled) by R.A.V 6
Despite the heinous and anti-Semitic character of Holocaust
denial, academics such as Alan Dershowitz have expressed deep
concern about silencing such speech. For Dershowitz, the cure for
defective speech is more speech: "[t]he marketplace of ideas
simply has to be allowed to operate even at the school level.
57
Dershowitz believes that too much time has been spent trying to
close down the revisionists and deniers without realizing that the
offending words will "get out" anyway.5 The response ought to
be more education, more speech, rather than trusting the govern-
ment to decide what may be spoken. Allowing the government to
say the Holocaust occurred presents the opportunity for a different
government to deny its validity.5 9
It is ironic that one of the best rationales for supporting
Dershowitz's position can be found in a Model Group Defamation
Statute that won first prize in a student contest at Hofstra Univer-
sity.' To those of us who cherish freedom of expression, the
55. See Debate, supra note 38, at 564-65.
56. The Court's opinion in R.A. V., per Justice Scalia, leaves some considerable doubts
as to the continued viability of Chaplinsky and Beauharnais. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
In fact, in his concurrence Justice White points out that Scalia's language suggests that
"earlier Courts did not mean their repeated statements that certain categories of expression
are 'not within the area of constitutionally protected speech."' Id. at 400 (White, J., concur-
ring) (citations omitted).
57. Debate, supra note 38, at 571. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927),
overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (upholding a statute that criminalized
advocacy of unlawful action as a way of changing political or industrial conditions).
58. Debate, supra note 38, at 570. Not all commentators share Dershowitz's faith in the
marketplace rhetoric. See, e.g., RICHARD ABEL, SPEECH AND RESPECT (1994) (recognizing
the need to offer redress for harms inflicted by hate speech, but proffering the remedy of
apology, rather than regulation or litigation); Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Apologize
and Move On?: Finding a Remedy for Pornography, Insult, and Hate Speech, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 93, 94, n.9 (1996) (book review); Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation
or Contradiction of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 789 (advocating limits on freedom of
speech when the harm it causes outweighs the value and importance of the speech). See also
Ronald Turner, Regulating Hate Speech and the First Amendment: The Allocations of and
Objections to, an Explicit Harms-Based Analysis, 29 IND. L. REV. 257 (1995) (assessing harm
to the target should be a part of the constitutional analysis).
59. Debate, supra note 38, at 571. From Dershowitz' perspective, "government is one
of the worst judges of truth." Id.
60. See JOSEPH RIBAKOFF, MODEL GROUP DEFAMATION STATUTE-FIRST PRIZE, in
GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 36, at xi, 337-41.
TORT REMEDY FOR HOLOCAUST DENIAL
Model Statute's requirement is chilling. The statute requires a state
agency to review films or movies before they can be shown and, if
found to be defamatory, the movie shall, by court order sought by
the reviewing agency, not be shown.6 The prior restraint required
under the statute raises exactly the same fears that motivate
Dershowitz's concerns.
62
Nevertheless, Dershowitz's view that a government can make
the truth appear and vanish at will63 is flawed. The occurrence of
the Holocaust does not turn on a governmental judgment, but
rather is a matter of fact which is amenable to proof, even if
disputed. For example, in one case' the trial judge took judicial
notice of the Holocaust stating that "[tihis court does take judicial
notice that Jews were gassed to death in Auschwitz in Poland in
the summer of 1944. ,65
IV. Academic Freedom
The case of Arthur Butz, the professor of electrical engineering
at Northwestern,66 presents the paradigmatic dilemma of what
ought to be done about Holocaust denial in the academy.
Although the Butz controversy initially took place in the post-
McCarthy67 late 1970s, this situation should be examined within
the context of the politically correct movement that has taken hold
at so many campuses. Inevitably, free speech, "P.C." speech and
academic freedom collide.6' One of the effects of the clash
between these tenets may be the distress, psychological harm and
stigmatization endured by those subjected to the quasi-academic
rhetoric of Holocaust denial.
Academic freedom in this country is protected in a variety of
ways. In 1915, a group of professors, precursor to the American
61. Id. at 338-40.
62. Cf. Debate, supra note 38, at 571.
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
65. See Holocaust not a Myth: Judge, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1981, § 3, at 11 (quoting
Superior Court Judge Thomas T. Johnson).
66. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
67. Universities were not stellar in their response to the McCarthy period. See ELLEN
SHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES (1986).
68. Thomas Gibbs Gee, "Enemies or Allies?": In Defense of Judges, 66 TEx. L. REV.
1617 (1988). Judge Gee of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has said
that "[on] today's campus, the most serious challenge to academic freedom and to the all but
indistinguishable first amendment right of free speech is crusading leftist bigotry." Id.
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Association of University Professors (AAUP), issued a General
Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure which extolled institutional neutrality and the necessity of
academic freedom to a college or university.69 Faculty handbooks
subscribe to academic freedom, faculty review boards consider
tenure and appointment decisions in light of it, and currently
Committee A of the AAUP watches assiduously over the concept.
Courts have castigated the refusal by a university to appoint a
professor because of his views;7" struck down a statute which
limited instructors' flexibility in choosing curricula;71 emphasized
that teachers should be free to study, inquire and evaluate; and
held unconstitutional an investigation by the legislature into the
subject matter of past lectures. While there is some disagree-
ment as to the extent the Constitution supports academic freedom,
especially through the First Amendment,74 the First Amendment
protects against state actions only. Thus, faculty at private
universities, such as Northwestern, cannot rely on a First
69. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic
Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1265, 1272, 1280 (1988). This article is part of a
rigorous symposium on academic freedom. See Symposium, Academic Freedom, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1247 (1988).
70. Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439, 446 (D. Colo. 1976), affd, 562 F.2d 1188, 1192
(10 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978).
71. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
72. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
73. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249-50.
74. See Julius G. Getman and Jacqueline W. Mintz, Forward: Academic Freedom in a
Changing Society, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1988).
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Amendment argument7" to protect their academic freedom to
speak the unspeakable.76
Nevertheless, given the strong force that the First Amendment
exerts, whether in its legal force (for a public/state institution) or
its moral force (for a private institution), and with our memories of
the McCarthy era intact, coupled with widespread concern over the
politically correct movement, we should be very careful about how
we deal with the Arthur Butzes of this world. However, a recent
case suggests a solution which would be grounded in the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The essence of the
proposal is to afford a civil tort remedy for those injured by
outrageous speech, without criminal punishment for the speaker,
concern for the sort of prior restraint proposed in some Model
75. See Metzger, supra note 69, at 1291. Even a public school teacher can fall outside
the ambit of First Amendment protection. Id. at 1295. If a University can offer "convincing,
firsthand proof.., that either the consequences of the [professor's] speech disrupted the
campus, classes,. . . or that [he] had turned his classroom into a forum for bizarre, shallow,
racist and incompetent pseudo-thinking and pseudo-teaching," then the First Amendment
would permit a University to punish a tenured professor. Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp.
1066, 1071-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In Jeffries, the court ordered City College of the City
University of New York (CUNY) to reinstate a tenured professor as Chair of the Black
Studies Department for lack of evidence of good cause. Id. at 1098. Although there was
some evidence that Jeffries had made anti-Semitic and racist remarks a decade before the
removal of Jeffries as Chair, CUNY failed to proffer sufficient evidence of a systematic
pattern of racist or anti-Semitic remarks. Id. at 1097. The court further noted that the
Constitution does not require a University "to disserve its own students by subjecting them
in class to the bigoted statements and absurd theories of any of its professors." Id. at 1098.
See also Donna Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between First
Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533, 2582 (1993). The
subsequent Jeffries litigation, ultimately resulting in judgment for defendants, 52 F.3d 9 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 173 (1995), is analyzed by Richard H. Hiers, New Restrictions
on Academic Free Speech: Jeffries v. Harleston 11, 22 J.C. & U.L. 217 (1995); Stephen A.
Newman, At Work in the Marketplace of Ideas: Academic Freedom, the First Amendment,
and Jeffries v. Harleston, 22 J.C. & U.L. 281 (1995).
In Jeffries II, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the reasoning of
Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct 1878 (1994), and concluded that the University had made a
"substantial showing of likely interference" with University operations. Jeifries 11, 52 F.3d
at 10, 13. At issue was Jeffries speech at a conference in Albany in July 1991 that contained
several "hateful and repugnant comments" concerning Jews. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1242.
Of course, if a private school accepts a great deal of governmental funding, it may
cease to be "private" and the potential for First Amendment protection may be implicated.
76. A different approach was taken by Paul D. Carrington, Dean of Duke University
School of Law, who urged "nihilists" to depart voluntarily from law schools because they
undermine students and leave them with "skills of corruption." See Paul D. Carrington, Of
Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984). Most took this comment to be
aimed at Critical Legal Studies adherents. See, e.g., Phoebe A. Haddon, Academic Freedom
and Governance: A Call for Increased Dialogue and Diversity, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1561, 1566-68
(1988).
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Statutes,77 or involvement of the disciplining academic institution
in the murky waters of academic freedom.
V. The Mermelstein Case
78
Sometime in the early 1980s, the Institute for Historical
Review79 issued an offer in its magazine to pay $50,000 to anyone
who could prove that Jews were gassed at Auschwitz. Mel
Mermelstein, a resident of California, had survived Auschwitz and
was outraged. He filed an affidavit with the Institute, which then
refused to pay. Mermelstein sued the Institute for breach of
contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress and other torts.
Part of the requested $1 million in damages for "psychological
punishment" was based on a lengthy deposition that Mermelstein's
attorney called "'one of the most brutal experiences I've ever sat
through."'8 Mermelstein, who had witnessed his mother and two
sisters being led away at Auschwitz, said that "[n]o feeling human
being in his right mind would try to prove that this didn't happen.
This is like digging up the dead and kicking them around-and the
dead include my mother and two sisters."81
Although the case settled for an amount including the
promised $50,000 and $100,000 in addition for the pain and
suffering sustained by Mermelstein, several interesting points
emerge. First, because the case was predicated on contract and tort
theories, the court would not have had to face directly issues posed
by the First Amendment.' Second, following provisions of the
California Civil Court similar to provisions in every state, the court
took judicial notice both of the Holocaust in general and, specifical-
ly, the gassing of Jews at Auschwitz.83 The gassing was "'a fact
and not reasonably subject to dispute' because of any number of
77. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
78. The case is unreported because it settled before trial for $150,000, which
Mermelstein donated to a Holocaust education foundation. The facts are drawn from
accounts in other sources. See, e.g., Lawrence Douglas, Wartime Lies: Securing the Holocaust
in Law and Literature, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 367, 371-72 (1995); Debate, supra note 38,
at 577-78.
79. See supra note 30.
80. See Holocaust not a Myth: Judge, supra note 65.
81. Id.
82. See Douglas, supra note 78, at 372.
83. See Debate, supra note 38, at 577. Compare the recognition given by state
legislatures to the Holocaust. See supra note 2.
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reliable sources other than Mermelstein." 84  This meant that
Mermelstein did not have to prove these facts; rather, they were
accepted by the court as truth in the same way a court accepts that
water is wet, night follows day, or that George Washington was our
first President.
It will be rare, indeed, when a Holocaust survivor or a relative
of a victim will stand in a contractual relationship 5 with the
purveyors of Holocaust denial. The hybrid contract/tort cause of
action in the Mermelstein case, therefore, is not helpful. It is
intriguing, however, that a tort remedy for Holocaust hoax rhetoric
might be available. In the next section, the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED) will be explored. This tort
may provide the deterrence required to reduce the rhetoric of
Holocaust denial, without criminalizing such hate speech8 6 and
without implicating academic freedom concerns.' The use of this
tort as an independent cause of action will also compensate those
who suffer directly from Holocaust denial hate speech.
VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Holocaust
Denial
For many years courts recognized mental distress as a
compensable harm, but until the 1930s and 1940s"s mental distress
damages were seen as parasitic to another more established tort,
such as assault or battery.8 9 There are several reasons for judicial
hesitancy in this area of psychological, as opposed to physical,
harm. As with any new cause of action, courts were cautious about
unleashing a new wave of litigation-the so-called "floodgate"
problem. But more particular to the mental distress issue was a
general discomfort about fraudulent claims and a specific distrust
84. See Holocaust not a Myth: Judge, supra note 65.
85. I.H.R. made a unilateral offer to pay for proof of the Holocaust that Mermelstein
accepted. I.H.R.'s failure to pay constituted a breach of the contract. See, e.g., JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 1-10, at 18 (3d ed. 1987).
86. Anti-Semitic literature and Holocaust revisionism are forms of hate speech. See
Matsuda, supra note 38, at 105-06. Further, anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial are linked
inextricably. See supra note 10.
87. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
88. Prosser led the way. See Dean William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1938). For an analysis of how "new torts" are
conceived and flourish, see Robert F. Blomquist, "New Torts": A Critical History, Taxonomy,
and Appraisal, 95 DICK. L. REV. 23 (1990).
89. Prosser, supra note 88.
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of psychological injury itself. Courts spoke of "the evanescent and
intangible" nature of mental distress.9° One assurance of the
reality of the alleged mental distress was to link it to another
tort9' or to recognize intentional infliction of mental distress as a
separate tort, but limit it to cases where a plaintiff suffered physical
consequences.9
But as the tort matured, no floodgates were opened and, post
Freud and Jung, American courts and society became increasingly
comfortable with the notion of psychological injury even in the
absence of concurrent or consequential physical injury93 or a
linking tort. As the Florida Supreme Court noted in 1958: the
"strained reasoning so often apparent when liability for [mental
suffering] is predicated upon one or another of several traditional
tort theories"94 is to be eschewed in favor of a carefully crafted,
independent tort with specific requirements for a plaintiff to meet
90. See Bartow v. Smith, 78 N.E.2d 735, 740 (Ohio 1948), overruled by Yeager v. Local
Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1983).
91. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel,
Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967). In Fisher, the defendant had snatched a plate from
plaintiff's (an African American) hand and shouted that Fisher could not be served. Id. at
628-29. The court, noting that "[p]ersonal indignity is the essence of... battery," held that
Fisher could recover "actual damages for mental suffering due to the wilful battery, even in
the absence of any physical injury." Fisher, 424 S.W.2d at 630. Other cases allowing
recovery for distress based on racial insult include: Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468
P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970); Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 341 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1959). Richard
Delgado has advocated a separate tort action for such situations. Richard Delgado, Words
that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 133 (1982).
92. See, e.g., Duty v. General Finance Co., 273, S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1954); Clark v.
Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
93. In a negligent infliction of mental distress case, the Texas Supreme Court noted that
"medical research has provided modern mankind with a much more detailed and useful
understanding of the interaction between mind and body. It is well recognized that certain
psychological injuries can be just as severe and debilitating as physical injuries." St.
Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1987). See also Molien v. Kaiser
Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (stating that "the attempted distinction between
physical and psychological injury merely clouds the issue").
The requirement of contemporaneous physical impact or consequential physical injury
lingered longer in the area of negligent, as opposed to intentional, infliction of emotional
distress. For a lively debate about the impact rule, see Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263 (Pa.
1958) (upholding the rule), and Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 90 (Pa. 1970) (discarding
the rule). Most courts have abandoned the impact rule, see WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 397 n.7 (8th ed. 1988), and an increasing number have
also rejected the physical manifestation requirement. See St. Elizabeth Hosp., 730 S.W.2d
at 652 n.3 (Tex. 1987).
94. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1958).
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before recovery can be had.95 As with other torts, courts ex-
plored, embraced and finally consolidated this post-Freudian,
twentieth century, independent cause of action for mental distress,
although courts still struggle with defining the elements of the tort
and with applying the elements to the facts of a particular case.
96
As currently formulated, the IIED tort involves four ele-
ments. 97  First, the defendant's conduct must be intentional or
reckless.98 Intent involves the desire or purpose to cause mental
distress or the knowledge that mental distress is substantially
certain to result from the conduct.99 Recklessness consists of
willful or wanton behavior involving a high probabilitythat mental
distress will ensue and proceeding in conscious disregard of that
likely result."° Second, the conduct must be extreme and outra-
geous:01 conduct that "go[es] beyond all possible bounds of
decency ... atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community."'"°  Courts have construed the term "conduct" in
such a way as to permit a cause of action based on outrageous,
extreme speech, if all other factors are established. °3 In fact, the
seminal IIED tort case involved a practical joker who told a
woman that her husband had been injured in an accident and had
suffered two broken legs.1"4 Third, there has to be a causal nexus
between the complained-of behavior and the emotional distress."0 5
However, a pre-existing susceptibility to emotional distress will not
preclude recovery provided that the conduct or speech can be
shown to have worsened the pre-existing psychological stress."
95. Plaintiff failed to meet the stated requirements. Id. at 398.
96. See Blomquist, supra note 88, at 35, 43-47, 94-96.
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
98. Id.
99. Id. at cmt. i.
100. Id.
101. Id. at § 46.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
103. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (analyzing a magazine
parody containing sexual double entendre); Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652 (S.D. 1984)
(examining obscene phone calls); Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977) (involving verbal
mimicking of plaintiff's stuttering disability over a five-month period); Slocum v. Food Fair
Stores, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (analyzing insulting language to customer in defen-
dant's store); State Rubbish Collector's Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 283 (Cal. 1952) (involving
verbal threats to beat up plaintiff and put him out of business).
104. Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
106. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977).
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Fourth, the plaintiff must suffer severe emotional distress;"°7
momentary embarrassment, annoyances or mere insults will not
suffice.10 8  Additionally, the distress suffered by a plaintiff must
be that which a "reasonable person 'of ordinary susceptibilities'
would undergo under the circumstances."1" Provided an lIED
plaintiff can plead and prove all four elements, recovery will be
permitted.
However, in 1988 the United States Supreme Court sounded
a cautionary note to the state tort remedy for IIED. In Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell,"' the Court considered whether the First
Amendment limits a state's authority to protect citizens from
IIED.n ' Since 1964, a public figure plaintiff12 suing for defa-
mation has been required to show actual malice; that is, "knowl-
edge that [the publication] was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." ' Despite the fact that IIED may
involve opinion and not statements of fact, and that truth or falsity
of the conduct or speech seems linked much more tenuously to
IIED than to defamation,'14 the Court in Hustler held that public
figures, such as Jerry Falwell, or public officials cannot recover for
IIED without showing that a publication contains a false statement
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
108. Id. at cmt. d.
109. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at
63 (5th ed. 1984).
110. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
111. Id.
112. A public figure is one who has over a period of time, achieved "pervasive fame or
notoriety" or one who has injected herself or been drawn into a particular public controversy
and thus is treated as a public figure for a limited number of issues. See Gertz v. Robert,
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
113. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
114. In order for a plaintiff to recover for defamation, she has to plead and prove that
a statement is both defamatory and false. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767 (1986). A defamatory communication is one that is likely to harm the reputation
of another, affecting her esteem in the estimate of the community, or to deter other persons
from associating with her. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 109, § 111, at 774. Because of
the reputational interests at stake, defamation by way of slander (oral) or libel (written)
requires that there be communication to a third person. In contrast, truth or falsity is not
considered an issue in tIED and the tort can be complete without any communication to a
third party. See e.g., Emmke v. DeSilva, 293 F.17 (8th Cir. 1923) (involving a hotel detective
that burst into a couple's room, yelled that the couple was unmarried, and threatened jail);
Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) (involving repeated unwanted offers for sexual
intercourse, accompanied by indecent pictures and exposures of defendant's body); Ruple
v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652 (S.D. 1984) (involving obscene phone calls).
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of fact made with "actual malice."' 15 This is necessary, said Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "to give adequate 'breathing space' to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
1 6
Whether Hustler affects significantly the analysis here is
doubtful. Though concerned about First Amendment constraints
on speech, the case can be read narrowly, confining its holding to
the specific situation of parody,"7 which would not normally be
at issue in the Holocaust deniaIIED case. Further, it is probable
that most of the IIED cases brought on the basis of Holocaust
denial will involve plaintiffs, such as students or fellow professors,
who will not be viewed as public figures. But even a public figure
plaintiff might have little difficulty showing the requisite "reckless
disregard" of truth, given such exemplary data as the Nuremberg
Trials, the states' recognition of the necessity for Holocaust
education,'t 8 Germany's acknowledgement of Nazi extermination
of Jews"19 and the personal accounts of innumerable eyewit-
nesses.
120
A Holocaust denial/IIED plaintiff may not encounter insupera-
ble obstacles when establishing the first three elements of the cause
of action: intent or recklessness; outrageous, extreme conduct or
speech; and a causal link to psychological harm.12 1  Many courts,
however, perhaps evidencing lingering discomfort with this
relatively "new [IIED] tort,"'" require a plaintiff to plead and
prove an additional element of severe distress; which is "a severely
disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct."'" In
115. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56.
116. Id.
117. The Court's special sensitivity to the parody genre is evidenced recently in its
copyright decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), which noted
that the defense of fair use must be construed broadly to accommodate the artistic demands
of parody.
118. See supra note 2.
119. See supra note 4 and acconianying text.
120. See supra notes 8-9; Will, supra note *.
121. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
123. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 616 (Md. 1977) (emphasis in original). See also
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (drawing a line between "mere
'emotional distress' and that causing 'severe emotional distress"'). In Harris, the defendant's
employee ridiculed plaintiff's speech impediment, allegedly causing "tremendous
nervousness," exacerbation of and increased sensitivity about a stuttering defect. Harris, 380
A.2d at 612. In Slocum, the defendant's employee used insulting language while plaintiff was
a customer in his store. Slocum, 100 So. 2d at 396. She alleged emotional distress, an
ensuing heart attack and aggravation of a preexisting heart condition. Id. at 396. In both
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the context of Holocaust denial rhetoric, a plaintiff might consider
reliance on any one or a combination of three ways of demonstrat-
ing the requisite severity of distress. These include: a focus on the
special relationship that exists between a student, professor and the
university or college; a recognition of the considerable psychologi-
cal harm triggered by such rhetoric; and a balancing of the
extremity and outrageousness of the defendant's speech with the
plaintiff's ensuing distress.
Historically, courts have held certain types of defendants to a
stricter standard of behavior than that applied to the average
defendant. 24  For instance, hotels"2 and common carriers'26
must adhere to a higher standard of conduct, and liability will result
if an employee uses insulting language to passengers. Such
generosity has not, however, been extended freely to other business
invitees,127 although a wrongful eviction/IIED claim by a tenant
against a landlord was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court."2
Concededly, the relationship between a student and a professor
is not the same as the relationship between a passenger and
common carrier, a guest and an innkeeper, or a tenant and a
landlord. Nevertheless, the relationship is considerably more than
a casual one. A student pays the university in exchange for an
education of purported quality, and the university pays the
professor to facilitate that education. The relationship is ongoing,
at least for the quarter or semester the student is enrolled in the
professor's course. In this sense, a student's relationship with the
professor is not too dissimilar to that between a passenger and a
carrier, a guest and a hotel, and a tenant and a landlord. In fact,
the student and professor relationship is far less fleeting than the
ones to which courts have given special deference in the IIED
context. "IT]he existence of a special relationship, arising either
from contract or from the inherent nature of a non-competitive
public utility, supports a right and correlative duty of courtesy
beyond that legally required in general mercantile or personal
relationships."'29 Provided the "offense [is] reasonably suffered
cases, the plaintiffs failed to convince the court of the severity of distress.
124. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
125. See Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923).
126. Lipman v. Atlantic Coast Line W.R.R., 93 S.E. 714 (S.C. 1917).
127. See Slocum, 100 So. 2d 396.
128. Brewer v. Erwin, 600 P.2d 398 (Or. 1979).
129. Slocum, 100 So. 2d at 398.
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by a patron from insult"13 by such defendants, a plaintiff can
recover.131  Thus, perhaps courts can be persuaded to hold
professors liable for their insulting language that denies the veracity
of the Holocaust, even if the resultant distress is somewhat less
than severe.
Another way of looking at the issue of the severity of a
plaintiff's distress is to rely on the poignant and persuasive
scholarship of those who have shown that significant psychological
harm ensues from hate speech. Such hate speech, whether explicit
or implicit, includes the Holocaust revisionism 132 espoused by
some in the academy. Numerous authors agree on the devastating
effects of certain kinds of "hate speech," though the remedies
proposed differ widely.3 3 Additionally, the international commu-
nity,'34  several states 135  and a few European countries and
Canada'36 acknowledge the special harm caused by hate speech.
Hate speech "injures the dignity and self-regard of the person to
whom it is addressed.' ' 137  Mari Matsuda would criminalize anti-
Semitic Holocaust hoax tracts, as they represent a "deep harm to
the living" and contain "the element of hatred and degrada-
tion. , 131 What we now know about the psychological injury
caused by hate speech may facilitate proof of the requisite severe
emotional distress that a plaintiff must show in an IIED case:
"[v]ictims of vicious hate propaganda experience physiological and
130. Id.
131. Courts "have gone to considerable lengths, holding the carrier liable for language
which is merely profane or indecent, or grossly insulting to people of ordinary sensibilities,
even though the mental disturbance is not attended by any illness or other physical
consequences." KEETON ET AL., supra note 109, at 58 (footnotes and citations omitted).
132. See Matsuda, supra note 38.
133. See, e.g., Debate, supra note 38, at 566-71 (encouraging "more speech"); ABEL, supra
note 55 (apology); RIBAKOFF, supra note 60 (advocating prior restraint); Delgado, supra note
91 (advocating a separate tort action for racial insults); Matsuda, supra note 38, at 111
(advocating the "adap[tation of] existing law and [the] crea[tion of] new law to limit hate
group activities"); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination,
in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 36, at 253; Arthur Berney,
Debate, supra note 38, at 576 (discussing civil remedy); Irwin Cotler, Debate, supra note 38,
at 565 (discussing civil antidiscrimination legislation). See also supra note 58; RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? (1997) (urging reformation of free
speech doctrine to deal with harm caused by hate speech).
134. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 2.
136. See Stein, supra note 4, at 33-39.
137. Delgado, supra note 91, at 135-36.
138. Matsuda, supra note 38, at 105-06.
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emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut to rapid pulse rate
and difficulty in breathing and nightmares .... [T]he recipient of
hate messages struggles with inner turmoil."'3 9
In addition to focusing on the relational aspect of Holocaust
denial in the academy and the demonstrated emotional suffering of
victims of such hate speech, a third way of looking at the "severe
distress" requirement is to balance the outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct or speech"4 with the asserted emotional
distress. Courts are as familiar with balancing as trapeze artists.
Whether in the context of creating a new tort14 or applying it to
a novel situation,"4 courts do, in fact, compare the interests at
stake. The extremity and outrageousness of Holocaust hoax
rhetoric, which in no way benefits society or the speaker,4  might
permit recovery upon a lesser showing of severe mental distress.
While not "every abusive outburst [ought to] be converted into a
tort,"1" Holocaust denial, especially in the academy, is beyond
the established boundary. As Arthur Berney points out, "[to] deny
a people their history is to deny them the most essential element
of their group existence. It is always a precursor to the subordina-
tion, diminishment, and ultimately the destruction of a people ....
This is very serious stuff. Not annoying, not uncomfortable. It's
more than that." 145  As one court noted in rejecting a physical
139. Id. at 95. Matsuda then describes her own reactions upon receiving a Holocaust
hoax leaflet: "my heart started racing as soon as I realized what a horrible thing I held in my
hand. I felt fear and revulsion that I was targeted to receive [it]." Id. at 118 (describing
Holocaust denial literature as "[t]he Cold Version of the Classic Forms of Anti-Semitism).
140. Recall the second element of the lIED tort: extreme and outrageous conduct/speech.
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
141. See Blomquist, supra note 88, at 125-26.
142. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). In
Tarasoff, parents brought a wrongful death action against four psychiatrists based on their
failure to warn their daughter that the psychiatrists' patient had threatened to kill her. Id.
at 340. The court weighed the danger of over-predicting and wrongfully predicting violence,
the need to have free and open communication to facilitate effective therapy, and patient
privacy against the public interest in safety from violent patients. Id at 345-47. It concluded
that in limited situations there is liability for failure to warn. Id. at 347-53.
143. Contrast the IIED cases where the speaker was trying to collect on a debt. See, e.g.,
McGrath v. Fahey, 520 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Public Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360
N.E.2d 765 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 1976); Passman v. Commercial Credit Plan of Hammond, Inc., 220
So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1969).
144. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1936).
145. Debate, supra note 38, at 572. Berney, Professor of Law at Boston College Law
School, likens distortion of Holocaust history to the issue of slavery: "When slaves were
brought to this country, part of the enslavement process was to destroy their history. Once
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injury requirement in an lIED cause of action, "[g]reater proof that
mental suffering occurred is found in the defendant's conduct
designed to bring it about.,
146
VII. Conclusion
The tort of lIED should be available to those who can plead
and prove that anti-Semitic rhetoric and Holocaust denial occurred,
while in attendance at the classroom, lecture hall or in faculty or
academic committee meetings, that caused them to suffer emotional
distress. When the conduct or speech is intentional or reckless,
extreme or outrageous and causes significant emotional distress, a
plaintiff ought to recover. Contemplated plaintiffs might include
survivors of the Death Camps, such as Mermelstein,147 and
relatives of the victims and survivors. It might be that any Jewish
person subject to Holocaust denial in the academy could be an
appropriate plaintiff as the penumbra of the Holocaust horrors can
be said to affect all Jews,1" with neo-Nazism as a pernicious
reminder.
Anti-Semitic language and Holocaust denial are a form of hate
speech. 49 Holocaust denial fits squarely within the crux of the
IIED tort: conduct or speech, "which in the eyes of decent
[people] in a civilized community is considered outrageous and
intolerable." 50  A university or school should aspire to be the
most civilized community. Thus, hate speech emanating from the
professoriate is particularly loathsome in a community of scholars.
Courts, too, have recognized that the outrageousness and extremity
of a defendant's conduct or speech must be examined, not in vacuo,
but in the milieu in which it occurs."' If the academy's special
that history was destroyed, it took a couple of centuries for the blacks, as a people, to revive
themselves." Id.
146. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (Cal. 1952) (holding
that juries can be trusted to determine whether mental distress results from defendant's
conduct). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 109, at 64 ("The enormity of the outrage
itself carries conviction that there has been severe and serious mental distress . .
147. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
148. I appreciate the suggestion made by my colleague Bruce Berner that he, as a
Lutheran, might also want to be included in the class of potential plaintiffs. The link
between Martin Luther's anti-Semitic tract, About Jews and Their Lies (1543) and the Nazis'
"Final Solution" has been noted by others as well. See Blain, supra note 36, at 47.
149. See Matsuda, supra note 38; Blain, supra note 36.
150. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 46, cmt. g (1948 Supp.).
151. See, e.g., Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla. 1986). Cf. Young v. Stensrude, 664
S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App. 1984) (denying a motion to dismiss a complaint based on showing a
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role is to pursue truth vigorously and to transmit knowledge, then
neither goal is served by Holocaust denial.
Although attempts have been made to criminalize such
speech1 52 or to subject the professor to academic discipline or
dismissal, 153 neither method recognizes the special distress caused
by Holocaust denial that can be experienced by survivors and their
families, as well as by relatives of the millions of Jews who were
put to death in the concentration camps. By relying on the IIED
tort, a survivor or a relative of a survivor or victim can bear witness
and confront those who would deny us our past, terrible though it
was. To paraphrase George Santayana, those who would deny the
past, condemn us to a second annihilation. Knowledge, memory
and truth are what save us. Lessons from history must not be
unlearned. Thus, we can reaffirm our commitment "to never again
permit the occurrence of another Holocaust."'"
VIII. Envoi
On a recent tour of the forward areas in First and Third
Armies, I stopped momentarily at the salt mines to take a look
at the German treasure .... But the most interesting-although
horrible-sight that I encountered during the trip was a visit to
a German internment camp near Gotha. The things I saw there
beggar description .... The visual evidence and the verbal
testimony of starvation, cruelty and bestiality were so overpow-
ering as to leave me a bit sick. In one room, where they [there]
were piled up twenty or thirty naked men, killed by starvation,
George Patton would not even enter. He said he would get
sick if he did so. I made the visit deliberately, in order to be in
a position to give first-hand evidence of these things if ever, in
the future, there develops a tendency to charge these allegations
merely to "propaganda.' 55
pornographic movie to an unsuspecting woman in a room with five men making obscene
remarks).
152. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of academic freedom issues, see supra notes 66-76 and accompany-
ing text..
154. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105 para. 5/27-20.3 (1995).
155. THE PAPERS OF DWIGHT DAvID EISENHOWER 2615-16 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. ed.
1970)(Letter from Eisenhower to George Catlett Marshall dated April 15, 1945)(emphasis
in original). A substantial portion of this quote is reproduced on one of the walls in the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
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